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About the Project 
The Rising Powers and Peacebuilding project seeks to address an important question that has 
not yet been thoroughly researched: what are the new approaches that rising powers have 
taken to peacebuilding, how do they differ from those of traditional powers and 
multilateral institutions, and what lessons can be learned from these new approaches?  
The policy briefs in this series provide a baseline on the roles of rising powers and their 
affiliated regional organizations in peacebuilding. To this point, little research has been 
conducted on the substance and impact of peacebuilding activities carried out by rising 
powers. This project seeks to address this gap in the research by providing a structured, 
critical analysis of the values, content and impact of recent peacebuilding initiatives of rising 
powers, comparing them to one another and to approaches by Western donors and 
international organizations. The project also aims to offer new theoretical claims about the 
role of the global South in peacebuilding, rooted in insightful empirical work (on Somalia, 
Afghanistan and Myanmar and on specific non-Western actors), and to make key policy 
audiences aware of alternative approaches and their empirical records and theoretical 
underpinnings (which may vary among values, global/regional power aspirations, 
bureaucratic approaches). 
The project partners will also produce case studies on the role of rising powers in 
peacebuilding, and include: ACCORD (an NGO based in South Africa), the Istanbul Policy 
Center (IPC), , the United Service Institution of India (USI), American University’s School of 
International Service (SIS), CSIS-Jakarta, and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
(NUPI). The project is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, American University, and NUPI.  
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Introduction 
 
Turkey owes its status as an emerging actor to its steady political and economic development 
in the first years of the 21st century and to the weakening of the Western, rule-based liberal 
order. This has enabled regional actors with relative economic stability and security to assume 
certain responsibilities that traditionally fell to the Great Powers in the Cold War era. Like 
most BRICS countries and other regional leaders, Turkey has ridden the tailwind of this 
global opening. Turkey also shares with some other emerging powers the experience of a 
successful transition, in less than a decade, to democracy and economic growth and stability. 
As the world transitioned to a multipolar system, Turkey used its religious, ethnic and cultural 
ties to consolidate its soft power, both regionally and further afield. During this period, 
Turkey has raised its profile as a regional actor and an emerging power, especially as the Arab 
Spring produced opportunities, crisis and warfare on its borders. It has achieved this status by 
investing its resources in development cooperation and peaceful resolution of conflicts in its 
region.   
 
These lessons, as well as Turkey’s status as a European Union candidate and a committed 
NATO ally, heighten Turkey’s role in the facilitation of peace in the region and reinforce its 
bridge status between geographical and cultural divides. As a Western-oriented, secular, 
predominantly Muslim country, Turkey is increasingly regarded as a pivot in effectively 
addressing both humanitarian and security aspects of the entrenched conflicts in Syria and the 
greater Levant. Turkey hosts approximately 2.2 million Syrian refugees, while at the same 
time giving an active support to the anti-ISIS coalition, through opening its airbases, training 
opposition forces, and joining airstrikes. For much of its history, however, Turkey was 
plagued by rampant insecurity and economic and political instability that saw four military 
coups, and a thirty-year armed insurgency. As such, Turkey’s activities may be supported by 
current economic and international shifts in power, yet its conceptualization and approach to 
peacebuilding is very much informed by the country’s experiences of insecurity. 1 
 
 
The Emergence of Turkish Peacebuilding 
 
Security and stability are two central issues that have guided Turkey’s strategic 
considerations. In the wake of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, 
modernization through alignment and membership of Western institutions was seen as crucial 
to preserving the security and stability that had been lost in preceding years. It is also in this 
context that some of the key aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy have emerged, such as non-
interference and respect for sovereignty. Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies have also 
been significantly influenced by the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. A 
number of his speeches, particularly the phrase “Peace at home, peace in the world” have 
been used to frame Turkey’s international engagement, from its first foray into peacekeeping 
with the UN in the 1950-53 Korean War, to peacebuilding activities today. Prime Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu has also reflected this principle, stating that Turkey has built a proactive 
foreign policy based on peace and stability at home.2 However, this policy has come under 
significant strain since the Arab Spring’s spread to the Levant and its transformation into a 
violent civil war in Syria and ethnic cleansing in Northern Iraq. These issues have directly 
                                                          
1 Interview with Turkish Diplomat, Vienna, June 15, 2015. Telephone Interview with Foreign Ministry official, 
Ankara, March 26, 2015. 
2 Ahmet Davutoğlu (2012) Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and. Regional Political Structuring, Center for 
Strategic Research, No. 3, April 2012. 
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affected  Turkey’s own security and stability. The suicide attacks since the June 7, 2015 
general elections that hit major southern cities Diyarbakır and Urfa, and the heart of Ankara, 
the Turkish capital, are all traced to ISIS cells that infiltrated through porous borders in the 
south. This has also led to  renewed clashes between Turkish security forces and the Kurdish 
PKK (The Kurdistan Workers’ Party) insurgency in the aftermath of the last general elections, 
which is equally detrimental to Turkey’s stability.  
 
For much of its history, security and stability was conceived in military terms and in relation 
to territorial integrity. Turkey’s first and only international intervention during the Cold War 
was its mediation between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s. This can be seen from a traditional 
security perspective, given the proximity of both countries to Turkey’s eastern flank. 
Following the loosening of the Cold War strictures, the Turkish International Cooperation and 
Development Agency (TIKA) was established in 1992 with the objective of extending 
Turkish relations with the newly independent Turkic States of Central Asia. TIKA was 
conceived as a mechanism of Turkish soft power through cooperation in the economic, 
cultural and humanitarian fields.3  For much of this period, however, TIKA was left to 
languish as an agency due to internal instability and a focus on a more hard security driven 
concept of military engagement. Turkey’s first foray into peacebuilding during this time was 
in Somalia and the Balkans in the 1990s. Turkey, for example, focused on contributing troops 
to multilateral peacebuilding and peace enforcement missions with the UN and NATO.  
 
The shift from such hard security-based peacebuilding to more civilian participation and 
technical assistance was facilitated by a change in domestic dynamics. Over the last decade, 
the Turkish Armed Forces has been losing its influence in foreign policy matters, which are 
now primarily determined by civilians in government. This was accompanied by expanded 
civilian and police participation in peace operations, increased engagement in multilateral 
organizations and a revival of TIKA activities. Facilitated by a period of relative political and 
economic stability and internal reforms that eased restrictions in political, religious and social 
spheres, Turkey began to expand its official development aid (see graph 1). Although 
retaining a strong military was a necessity due to the instability of the surrounding region, 
under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), civic and economic power was promoted as 
a more sustainable method of foreign engagement.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Teri Murphy & Onur Sazak (2012) Turkey’s Civilian Capacitry in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Istanbul: 
Istanbul Policy Center 
4 Teri Murphy & Auveen Woods (2014) Turkey’s International Development Framework Case Study: Somalia, 
Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center. 
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The Tools of Turkish Peacebuilding 
 
Domestic changes were accompanied by a restructuring of Turkish foreign policy priorities 
and goals under the AKP. This has served to both promote the prestige of a more 
internationally active Turkey and to reinforce the success of the country’s leadership.5 Guided 
by Ahmet Davutoğlu (key adviser and then foreign minister from 2009-14), a multilateral 
foreign policy emerged that sought a balance between proactive engagement and crisis 
management. Turkish leaders have increasingly emphasized the need for preventive 
diplomacy that should be intricately linked to any conflict management strategies, whether it 
is peacekeeping or peacebuilding activities. Identifying mediation and dialogue as essential 
tools in this preventative diplomacy, officials have stated that “peace mediation and 
facilitation efforts are the most cost-effective and efficient way of preventing and resolving 
conflicts”.6 Reflecting this commitment, Turkey has headed a number of initiatives. In 2005 
the Alliance of Civilizations, which promotes interreligious and intercultural dialogue, was 
launched by the Prime Ministers of Spain and Turkey.7 In 2010, Turkey and Finland created a 
“Group of Friends of Mediation” that supports efforts by the UN, regional organizations and 
over 40 countries.8 These are cross-cultural examples that Turkish officials have identified as 
reflecting the country’s conceptualization of peacebuilding.9 Through these initiatives Turkey 
has sought to promote flexibility, trust and cooperation as the basis of successful mediation.10 
In parallel to these efforts, Turkey launched a process on peacebuilding during its time on the 
                                                          
5 Kathryn Achilles, Onur Sazak, Thomas Wheeler and Auveen Elizabeth Woods. (2015, March). Turkish Aid 
Agencies in Somalia; Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace, Safeworld and Istanbul Policy Center, p. 4. 
6 S/PV.6472.  
7 Alliance of Civilizations, http://www.unaoc.org/  
8 Group of Friends of Mediation (Group of Friends of Mediation), http://peacemaker.un.org/friendsofmediation 
9 “Speech Delivered by H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu at the Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, 28 May 2014, Algeria”. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-delivered-by-h_e_-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-at-the-ministerial-conference-
of-the-non_aligned-movement_-28-may-2014_-algeria.en.mfa 
10 “Resolution of Conflicts and Mediation” (n.d). Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-of-conflicts-and-mediation.en.mfa   
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Security Council from 2009-2010, which included these initiatives and brought together the 
Council for thematic meetings in Istanbul from 2010 to 2013.11  
 
Issues around “hard security” are still a strategic priority for Turkey’s foreign policy, but it is 
no longer the determining consideration, with Davutoğlu stating that “stability cannot be built 
on the basis of force alone”.12  Referencing the decade of reforms inside Turkey, Davutoğlu 
has argued that there must be a balance between freedom and security to achieve stability. 
Over the years the concept of “security” has become more multidimensional, focusing on 
human needs through good governance and economic stability. This is evident in Turkey’s 
rhetorical embrace of “humanitarian diplomacy,” a developing concept that Turkish officials 
have increasingly used to frame its re-positioning and activities in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring. Humanitarian diplomacy claims to reject state-centric realpolitik and external 
interference in domestic affairs. Highlighting the importance of acknowledging “local 
values”13 and local ownership,  it instead emphasizes the need to put human dignity and 
human security at the forefront of policy considerations.14  
 
There is no concept paper that explicitly describes Turkey’s definition of peacebuilding. It 
can, however, be understood through bilateral and regional initiatives, norms and discussions, 
such as those already mentioned, that have emerged among the country’s representatives over 
the last decade. From a Turkish perspective, peacebuilding is a twofold process, 
encompassing both statebuilding and peacemaking within society. Reflecting a structural 
approach to peacebuilding, Turkish officials emphasize the centrality of good governance, 
strong responsive institutions and the rule of law for building an effective state and therefore a 
stable and peaceful society.15 Activities related to these goals by officials include 
infrastructure projects, technical assistance and capacity building programs for state 
institutions and personnel. This kind of structural peacebuilding must also be accompanied by 
an inclusive peacemaking process at all levels. Turkish officials feel that this is only possible 
through national ownership of goals and culturally-sensitive engagement with all 
stakeholders, including civil society, professional associations and women. This is particularly 
important with regard to responsive political institutions and inclusive economic recovery that 
Turkish officials believe is essential for a peaceful society Activities associated with societal 
peacebuilding include education programs, religious support and inclusive economic 
development.  
 
Economic interests are intricately linked to both Turkey’s foreign policy and peacebuilding 
activities. This has not only led to economic dividends for Turkey, but also promoted peace in 
some cases. Notably, the historically tumultuous relations between Turkey and its Kurdish 
citizens and neighbors in Iraq, have eased greatly following the expansion of economic and 
diplomatic relations with Iraqi Kurdistan.16 In 2013, exports to Iraq reached $12 billion, 
                                                          
11 “Candidacy of the Republic of Turkey to the United Nations Security Council for the period 2015-2016”, 
(n.d). Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/candidacy-of-the-
republic-of-turkey-to-the-united-nations-security-council-for-the-period-2015-2016.en.mfa 
12 Ahmet Davutoğlu (2012), p. 3. 
13 Ahmet Davutoglu (2013) Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects, Nationalities 
Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 41:6, p. 865-870, DOI:10.1080/00905992.2013.857299 
14 Fuat Keyman & Onur Sazak, ‘Turkey as a Humanitarian State’, POMEAS, Paper No 2. 
http://pomeas.org/Home/index.php/publications/pomeas-papers/419-turkey-as-a-humanitarian-state 
15 Telephone Interview Foreign Ministry official, Ankara, March 26, 2015 
16 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Embracing Iraq’s Kurds as Trade Erodes Old Enmity,” Bloomberg Business, July 
11, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-10/turkey-s-embrace-of-iraqi-kurds-shows-trade-
eroding-old-enmity 
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making it second only to Germany as Turkey's largest market.17 There are also some links 
between Turkey’s economic interests and its aid practices in general. Egypt, for example was 
one of the top 5 recipients of Turkish aid for 201318 and the 14th largest destination for 
Turkish exports in 2015.19 In Afghanistan, Turkish companies’ rank 5th among foreign 
investors, with 140 registered in the country. 20Officials have also been frank about their 
interest in expanding economic relations with Somalia.21 While not a specific policy, a pattern 
has emerged in which the establishment of a diplomatic presence in a new country is often 
soon followed by investment from Turkish companies and new flight links through Turkish 
airlines. Turkish diplomats are candid about their conviction that trade is better than aid for 
development.22 Most Turkish officials regard economic development through the participation 
of the entire society as an essential component of peacebuilding, with one diplomat stating 
“{W}e don’t think that peacebuilding could achieve its goals if there is no economic recovery 
and participation of the whole part of the society in the program; that includes women”.23 
They believe it provides alternative financial opportunities to criminality and extremist 
narratives, and supports national ownership of development.  
 
Many of Turkey’s peacebuilding activities are funneled through Turkish development aid. In 
2013, Turkey's Official Development Assistance (ODA) was among the highest of the 
emerging powers, at US $3,307 billion.24 This represents a tenfold increase from 2002 to 
2010, and nearly a 30 percent increase between 2010 and 2013 (see graph 1). Despite 
Turkey’s participation in a number of multilateral initiatives, US$3.2 billion of this ODA was 
provided in bilateral assistance,25 illustrating the country’s preference for this mode of 
engagement. Turkey has expanded its activities to some of the world's most entrenched 
conflicts. In both 2012 and 2013, Syria, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, and Afghanistan were 
the largest recipients of ODA. Some of the best examples of both the structural and social 
peacebuilding approaches of Turkey are evident in Afghanistan, Somalia and Balkan 
countries such as Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo.  
 
Much of Turkey’s structural peacebuilding activities consist of technical capacity programs, 
infrastructure projects, and the provision of basic services. This understanding of constructive 
development, which is common to both Turkish state agencies and non-state actors, has strong 
historical roots. Since the Ottoman Empire, privately funded philanthropic development 
projects have focused on the construction of buildings and infrastructure as well as the 
funding of services such as schools, hospitals and mosques.26 In 2013, US $225 million was 
                                                          
17 Ibid. An estimated 1,300 Turkish companies’ work in Iraq. 
18 TIKA, “TIKA Annual Report 2013”, (2014), 
19 “Foreign Trade Statistics, January 2015” (2015, February 27). Republic of Turkey Ministry of Customs and 
Trade: Turkish statistical Institute Press Release. Retrieve from 
http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=18576  
20Selçuk Çolakoğlu and Mehmet Yegin. “The Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, International 
Strategic Research Organization (USAK), (2014, September): 34 
21 Interview with Foreign Ministry Officials Istanbul, August 25, 2015. 
22 Interview with Turkish Diplomat, Istanbul, February 25, 2014. 
23 Telephone Interview Foreign Ministry Official, Ankara, June 10 2015.  
24 Füsun Gür, Nurdan Çakır, Şevki Mert Barış et al., “Turkish Development Assistance 2013, Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency, (2014), 3. See also “Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013,” 
(Development Initiative, 2013), 25. Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013 ranks Turkey as the fourth 
largest government donor of humanitarian assistance. 
25 Füsun Gür, Nurdan Çakır, Şevki Mert Barış et al., “Turkish Development Assistance 2013, Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency, (2014), 9. 
26 Filiz Bikmen. (2008). The rich history of philanthropy in Turkey: a paradox of tradition and modernity. In 
MacDonald, N., & Tayart de Borms, L (eds). Philanthropy in Europe A rich past, a promising future. London: 
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provided in bilateral technical assistance.27 This included  training programs for judges and 
prosecutors from Kosovo and medical training programs, for example with the Somali 
Ministry of Health.28 Infrastructure projects, such as renovating state buildings or building 
schools and roads, are common across all the countries Turkey engages with29. Such 
infrastructure and technical cooperation programs appear to focus on improving the provision 
of basic services such as medical and judicial standards. Turkish officials have said that they 
feel such programs directly support statebuilding by legitimizing the state’s authority and 
making services more effective, though they are quick to emphasize that their support must be 
apolitical in nature, stating ““We can only offer them certain technical expertise without any 
strict recipe. It is after all the requirements of the host country to determine how they will 
proceed”.30 
 
Technical assistance and capacity building programs are also a characteristic of Turkey’s 
social peacebuilding. Most of these programs include training and technical assistance to 
support economic empowerment and appear to be focused at the local level through 
municipalities and communities. For example, technical equipment assistance was provided to 
the Governorship of Sar-e Pol for vocational training programs for women and the 
Agricultural Development Project in East Bosnia was established to support the return of 
families from the 1992-1995 war.31 These are just some of the local projects aimed at 
economically empowering communities. Technical assistance is also a part of other social 
peacebuilding activities in the education field, such as providing technical equipment for high 
schools and universities.  
 
Education has been one of the more widely known areas of Turkey’s peacebuilding activities 
due to its extensive scholarship programs in Somalia. These were provided by, among others, 
the Education Ministry and Diyanet (the Ministry of Religious Affairs). With the exception of 
Somalia, however, most scholarship and education programs have been run by third sector 
organizations32 such as the Hizmet or Gülen linked schools. The Turkish state tends to run 
smaller education programs, such as providing school materials and equipment, funding and 
renovating buildings and promoting Turkish language and cultural courses. Education 
initiatives such as these are not only a method of expanding Turkish soft power, but also 
contribute to social peacemaking through intercultural dialogue. As one NGO official stated, 
“for conflict resolution we think that education has a primary effect”.33 Both officials and 
third state actors believe that education is a key peacebuilding tool that can counter the 
narrative of extremism and provide opportunities for the future.34 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Alliance Publishing Trust, p. 223-234. 
27 27Füsun Gür, Nurdan Çakır, Şevki Mert Barış et al., “Turkish Development Assistance 2013, Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency, (2014), 22-23. 
28 TIKA, (2014), p. 51; 164 
29 TIKA, “TIKA Annual Report 2012”, (2013), and “TIKA Annual Report 2013” (2014).  
30 Interview with Turkish Diplomat, Vienna, June 15, 2015 
31 TIKA, (2014), p. 203; 37-38. 
32 There are a wide range of other non-governmental bodies in Turkey administering development programs. 
This includes nonprofit groups, foundations, faith-based organizations, schools, and professional associations 
such as businessmen and doctors. These groups vary in their ideologies, their orientation, and their relationship 
with and autonomy from the state. As such, the term “third sector” is a suitably broad term to categorize the 
various groups of non-state actors that are engaged in peacebuilding activities. Korel Göymen, “The Evolvıng 
State – Third Sector Relations In Turkey” in The Third Sector in Europe: Prospects and Challenges, ed. 
Stephen P. Osborne (Routledge, London and New York, 2008), 211-229 
33 Interview with Kimse Yok Mu official, Istanbul, March 2015. 
34 Interview Istanbul with Yeryüzü Doktorları staff, March 2015. Telephone interview with Foreign Ministry 
Official, March 26 2015. 
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Finally, Turkey’s social peacebuilding activities are also characterized by an emphasis on 
mediation and culturally and religiously sensitive programs. The programs range from 
providing Qurans, sponsoring intercultural activities to circumcision ceremonies for boys in 
countries such as Afghanistan and Niger.35 Given the scope of these programs globally, 
cultural sensitivity is clearly an important aspect of Turkey's activities. Such programs are not 
only pragmatic, but they also add legitimacy to Turkish activities in the eyes of locals. In 
Afghanistan, Turkish projects were more acceptable to communities than others because of 
their perceived sensitivity to Afghan culture.36 Similarly, the building of Mosques and 
distribution of meats and gifts at Muslim religious festivals has been welcomed by locals from 
Mogadishu to Sarajevo. Related to these efforts is mediation. Officials have stated the 
centrality of mediation, not only at an inter-state level but also at the local level through 
everyday activities. This may range from consulting with communities to discussions with 
political authorities on bilateral projects. Turkish officials feel that mediation and consultation 
are mechanisms that support the principles of national ownership that they espouse.  
 
 
Impact and Conclusions 
 
Over the last decade, Turkey’s approach to peacebuilding has transformed from the strategic 
state-centric security engagement of the 1990s to a more multifaceted conceptualization that 
encompasses both statebuilding and social peacemaking. This has been facilitated by a change 
in civil-military power dynamics since 2000, and a broader understanding of security that 
considers the issue of human needs. Peacebuilding activities today range from technical 
assistance for state services to culturally sensitive education and religious programs. This has 
been developed in parallel with new foreign policy activities that emphasize both mediation 
and enhanced economic ties as potential peacebuilding strategies that are of mutual benefit to 
both Turkey and recipient states.  
 
In spite of Turkey’s good intentions to promote peace and stability in its region and the rest of 
the world, Ankara’s capacity to execute this vision has some shortcomings. An estimated 2.2 
million Syrian refugees, the resurgence of PKK terrorism, ISIS’ penetration deep into the 
country’s urban centers, the continuing political uncertainty in the aftermath of the last 
general elections, and a receding economy constitute serious obstacles to the sustainability of 
Turkey’s peacebuilding operations.37 Additionally, for the last several years Turkey’s 
ambitious foreign policy goals and determination to project its soft power have alienated 
various supporters. Counting on African support to win another term on the UN Security 
Council in 2016, Turkey only received the votes of 60 countries out of 193.38  Losing the 
African countries’ support is due to a number of reasons, but the most visible one is the fight 
between the Turkish government and the Islamist philanthropist Fethullah Gülen, whose 
charity organization has allegedly orchestrated a coup against the AKP government.39 
Ironically, the Gülenist charity organizations have been the most visible and committed NGOs 
                                                          
35 TIKA, (2014), p. 35; 200; 229. 
36 Murphy & Sazak, (2012). 
37 David Shinn, “Turkey’s Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: Shifting Alliances and Strategic Diversification,” 
London: Chatham House, September 2015, 17.  
38 Harut Sassounian, “Why the UN Rejected Turkey’s Bid for a Security Council Seat,” The Huffington Post, 
October 28 2014, accessed October 26, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/harut-sassounian/why-the-un-
rejected-turke_b_6036878.html 
39 Shinn, 16-17.  
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in providing humanitarian assistance to sub-Saharan Africa.40 Viewed in light of Turkey’s 
false predictions about the longevity of the Assad regime in Syria,41 Ankara’s recognition of 
the depth of the crises that it is trying to help resolve around the globe, and its influence over 
the parties, appear to be waning. In other words, the rhetoric-capacity mismatch in Turkish 
foreign policy risks moving Turkey farther away from “zero problems with neighbors” 
towards the dangerous territory of “zero neighbors without problems.”42 
 
A number of organizational challenges hinder the ability of the Turkish state from realizing its 
potential to increase the quality and range of its peacebuilding initiatives. The most persistent 
of these impediments is coordination problems. First identified in a 2012 report, 43 a lack of 
effective interagency cooperation was the most visible problem in Turkish peacebuilding 
activities. The most vital ministries and the government agencies that are involved in 
peacebuilding operations, such as the Foreign Ministry, Health Ministry, Development 
Ministry, and TİKA, were not informed about each other’s activities both at the higher 
echelons of decision making or in the field. Recent research indicates that very little progress 
has been made at both the state and third sector level.44 One representative of an international 
organization based in Ankara volunteered that most TİKA bureaucrats in charge of 
coordination are not even familiar with the basic UN procedures and terms.45 The lack of 
institutional training and knowledge of procedures within organizations like TİKA also 
complicates communication and coordination between the field offices and Ankara. In such 
situations, the quality and effectiveness of the programs often depends on the individual in the 
field office: If the person assigned to a country office is in fact interested in the mission, 
TİKA operations in that particular country often provide more substantive results for the 
beneficiaries.46 
 
This lack of communication and coordination also affects the development and monitoring of 
programs. While TIKA publically provides data on the number of participants or equipment 
involved in technical assistance programs, greater analysis on how these programs are 
determined or their impact is not made available. There have been reports in the past of 
peacebuilding programs such as infrastructure projects or trainings being implemented 
without consultation with local authorities or research on other aid groups working in the 
area.47 These problems appeared to have occurred in countries that TIKA had become newly 
active in, such as Somalia48 or Senegal.49 This also indicates an important vacuum in the pre-
deployment analyses and monitoring activities for state operating in the field. Such patterns 
can however, exacerbate overcrowding, duplication and waste.50 
                                                          
40 Ibib.  
41 “Premier vows to pray in Damascus mosque ‘soon,’” Hürriyet Daily News, September 6, 2012, accessed 
October 26, 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/premier-vows-to-pray-in-damascus-mosque-
soon.aspx?pageID=238&nID=29505&NewsCatID=338.  
42 Sassounian, “Why the UN Rejected Turkey’s Bid for a Security Council Seat,” 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/harut-sassounian/why-the-un-rejected-turke_b_6036878.html 
43 Ibid. 
44 Achilles, Sazak, Wheeler, and Woods, 2015. 
45 Interview with UNDP-TIKA coordinator, Istanbul, March 13, 2015. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Interviews with the representatives of Turkish NGOs operating in Africa, as well as Kızılay officials, and 
presentations by Paul Larson on “Logistics of Health Aids,” Stephen Gloyd, “Sustainability of Health Aids,” 
and Maryam Deloffre, “International NGO Behavior and Interactions with States” at the joint IPC-TİKA 
workshop on “International Humanitarian NGOs and Health Aid” on March 27, 2015, Istanbul.  
48 Interview with Turkish Diplomat, February 27, 2014. 
49 Telephone Interview with UNDP-TIKA coordinator,  Ankara, March, 13, 2015 
50 Interviews with the representatives of Turkish NGOs operating in Africa, as well as Kızılay officials, and 
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In addition to these problems is the equally detrimental financing challenge of international 
operations. The influx of Syrian refugees, for instance, has cost the state an estimated $7 
billion and led to nearly $2 billion worth of resources being rechanneled from foreign 
operations. This diverted significant resources from fragile states such as Somalia.51 In 
addition, the volatility of the Turkish lira against hard currencies, as well as the current 
political uncertainty as the government struggles to form a coalition after the 2015 general 
elections, is taking a toll on the economic stability that is necessary to sustain the funds for 
some of these peacebuilding initiatives. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
presentations by Paul Larson on “Logistics of Health Aids,” Stephen Gloyd, “Sustainability of Health Aids,” 
and Maryam Deloffre, “International NGO Behavior and Interactions with States” at the joint IPC-TİKA 
workshop on “International Humanitarian NGOs and Health Aid” on March 27, 2015, Istanbul.  
51 Achilles, Sazak, Wheeler, and Woods, 2015. 
